ABSTRACT
In October 1916, the solicitors Shapley and Schwartz wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Andrew Bonar Law, on behalf of all Somalis residing in four "villages" set within the rapidly expanding city of Nairobi, to petition against a proposal to relocate them to a nomadic camp at M'bagathi, eight miles from the city centre. 1 Attached to the petition was a map depicting a proposed alternative "model village for the Somali," located on the Nairobi River. 2 Although the planned relocation of the Somali villages to M'bagathi never materialized, and the Somali campaign for a new model village was short and ultimately unsuccessful, even if it was "vigorous," 3 both the proposed relocation of the Somali to M'bagathi by the government of the British East Africa Protectorate (EAP) and the alternative Somali plan for a new model village raise several points of wider relevance for the history of the Kenyan Somali: the use of encampment to limit integration with the rest of Kenyan society (from the proposed camp at M'bagathi, to the establishment of a "closed district" in the Somali inhabited Northern Frontier District (NFD), and more recently the encampment of Somali refugees at Kakuma and Dadaab); the commonly observed tendency for the Somali to be classified as a purely nomadic population; and the often ignored potential of Somali agency. This latter point is an important but perhaps unfashionable one to emphasize given the focus the media repeatedly places on the rejection and restriction of Somali people in Kenya, alongside significant human rights abuses. 4 Whilst the Kenyan Somali have received increasing attention from anthropologists and political scientists in recent years, deeper histories of Kenyan citizens of Somali origin and the interactions of the Kenyan Somali with the state are still relatively limited in number. 5 In part this is a scholarly reflection of the marginalization of Somali inhabited areas of Kenya by both the colonial and postcolonial state, and it reflects a popular conviction that Kenyan citizens of Somali origin are not fully native to the Kenya nation state. The participation of the Kenyan Somali in a campaign for the creation of "Greater Somalia" during the 1960s and their transnational connections to a global Somali diaspora certainly seems to confirm this second point, and it is often assumed that those living in suburbs of Nairobi have entered the country illegally from Somalia, or have migrated from the large refugee camps located in the north of the country. As such, many perceive the Somali to be temporarily encamped in the city, and negative stereotyping as refugees and illegal immigrants leaves Somalis living in Nairobi vulnerable to abuses by the government and the security forces. 6 By tracing the history of the proposed new model village for the Somali, and the nature of the interactions of the very first urban Somali in Kenya with the colonial authorities, this article provides an important corrective to current popular perceptions. In particular, through an analysis of the campaign for the creation of the new model village, and the ways in which the urban Somali negotiated the colonial government's plans for the development of the city, the article emphasizes the longevity of Somali claims for recognition and rights from the state. At the same time, the article makes clear that these claims for rights and recognition were in tension with the colonial government's own plans for the city, which drew on an image of the Somali as nomads and livestock traders, and therefore not "natural" urban-dwellers.
This article will begin with a brief description of the general demographic make up of Kenya's ethnic Somali population during the colonial period, and examines how the authorities perceived them. It will then look in particular at the origins of the urban Nairobi Somali and the space that they created for themselves in the city. The article then moves to consider the colonial plans for the removal of the Somali to M'bagathi, as well as the Somali's own plans for a new model village. Finally, the article will consider some of the connections between the campaign for a new model village and subsequent attempts by the Somali to shape colonial urban development. Overall, the article shows that Somali agitation regarding the new model village was not simply an expression of political demands, but was also a manifestation of an urban aspiration that has been continued by more recent efforts by Somali groups to settle in urban areas, and especially in Nairobi.
Kenya's Ethnic Somalis
Kenya has always had an indigenous ethnic Somali population. At the time of the first establishment of the EAP (which became the Kenya Colony in 1920), the majority of ethnic Somalis lived in Jubaland Province and in the eastern half of the NFD. 7 Most were pastoral Darod or Hawiye Somali, who had migrated south of the River Juba in 1860. 8 Although the British ceded Jubaland to the Italians in 1925, they retained the Somali dominated NFD districts of Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir, what is now often referred to as the North Eastern Province of Kenya (NEP). This was an economically unviable area, and the pastoralists that lived within it criss-crossed colonial frontiers in search of water and pasture. Rather than attempt to limit these cross-border movements or integrate the region with the rest of Kenya, the British preferred to govern it as a "closed district." Under the terms of the 1902 Outlying Districts Ordinance, non-resident travel to and from the NFD was prohibited, except with the permission of the provincial commissioner. This policy can help to explain the ambivalence of the pastoral Somali towards the colonial state, and their involvement in the Somali secessionist war when Kenya gained independence in December 1963. 9 At around the same time as the Darod and Hawiye Somali moved south of the River Juba into what became the EAP, Isaq and Herti Somali also gradually moved down the northern Somali coast from Aden to Kismayu, Mombasa, and Zanzibar. 10 A number of these Somali became involved in an inland trade in ivory and livestock, while others found employment with Europeans as askaris and gun-bearers, or entered government service as clerks, interpreters, or soldiers in the King's African Rifles (KAR). 11 Subsequent waves of Isaq and Herti Somali also came to Kenya after service in the KAR during the First and Second World Wars. 12 As immigrants and the descendants of immigrants from British Somaliland, Somalia, and Aden, the Isaq and Herti Somali are also referred to as the "Alien Somali" in official discourse. 13 Most of the initial wave of Isaq and Herti Somali to the EAP ended up residing in townships or trading centres, so that by the 1920s, there were sizable Isaq and Herti communities in Nanyuki, Nyeri, Kakamega, Kajiado, Maralal, Nakuru, Embu, Kitale, and Eldoret. 14 The largest urban Somali settlement was nonetheless in Nairobi, where British officials engaged in overseeing the construction of the Uganda-Mombasa railway built the first permanent buildings in 1896. 15 When the railway tracks reached the frontier town in 1899, the British noted that there were already a number of Somalis living in Nairobi, and by 1914 this number had grown to around 300. 16 After 1927, Isiolo Town became the second most important urban Somali centre. 17 Isiolo was initially developed as a strategic base for the KAR (acting as a "gate" between the north and the rest of the Kenya Colony), and it became the regional headquarters of the NFD in 1929. The British also envisioned Isiolo as somewhere to permanently resettle Isaq and Herti ex-soldiers that were resident in other townships in the colony, because it was believed that their accumulation of livestock had "damaged local grazing." 18 Groups of Isaq and Herti from elsewhere in Kenya began arriving in Isiolo at the beginning of 1929, though this migration was officially halted in 1930, when it was discovered that the colonial authorities had ambiguously defined the boundary between Isiolo and Meru, and Isiolo Town was actually situated just across the border in Meru district. 19 In practice Somali migration to Isiolo continued, and by 1940 it was estimated that there were 1,200 Isaq and 800 Herti families living there. 20 Kenya has therefore not only always had an indigenous Somali population, but also a heterogeneous indigenous Somali population. In contrast to current popular narratives of the Kenyan Somali, which tend to conflate and homogenize the community, the early colonial authorities in Kenya had conflicting opinions about this diverse community. On the one hand, they were regarded by the British as resistors "par excellence." 21 The explorer and colonial administrator Henry Johnston remarked in 1913 that "they [the Somali] have shown themselves inimical from the start," while the governor of Kenya noted in 1928 that the "Somali tribesmen have always adopted an independent and truculent attitude . . . they defy our laws and pay no taxes." 22 This is despite the point made by E. R. Turton that although a number of Somali did resist British authority, some groups, including the Ogaden at Afamdu, the Aluihan at Serenli, the Marehan on the River Juba, and the Garre on the River Daua, sought temporary government protection as a consequence of local political circumstances, especially the threat of new arrivals of southwards migrating Somali groups from the Ogaden region of southern Ethiopia. 23 Yet at the same time, a certain amount of deference was also shown towards the Somali. Another explorer and geologist, J. W. Gregory, noted, "scratch the Somali and you will find the Arab with Arabian capacity for devotion and discipline, and latent powers of organization." 24 Similarly, Charles Eliot, commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate between 1900 and 1904, commented "there can be no doubt that they are the most intelligent race in the protectorate." 25 The ambivalence of the British towards the Somali was in large part a reflection of the differentiation between the predominantly trade oriented "Alien" Isaq and Herti Somali, on the one hand, and the primarily pastoralist and domiciled Hawiye and Darod Somali, on the other. The distinction also created an administrative headache for colonial officials concerned with categorizing the African population into distinct races and cultures. The Somali undermined the racial order by blurring the boundary between "native" and "non-native," which resulted in the Somali acquiring an ambiguous legal status in the EAP. 26 Somalis were considered natives under the 1910 Native Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance, but were exempt from the 1915 Native Registration Ordinance, which required all Africans to carry a kipande (an identity card that restricted African mobility). 27 According to Keren Weitzberg, Isaq and Herti leaders expressed grievances at having to carry a kipande and were able to use their history of imperial service to negotiate greater rights in the context of a struggle by the authorities in the first decades of the protectorate to define an emerging racial hierarchy. 28 While this perspective underscores the point about the longevity of Somali claims for recognition and rights from the state, the exemption of Kenyan Somalis from pass laws in the early days of the EAP also contrasts with the more recent requirement for Somalis living in Kenya to go through additional vetting in order to gain a national identity card. 29 
The Making of Somali Villages in a Colonial Capital
The pattern of urbanization in colonial Kenya was inextricably linked to the British imperial project. In 1895 it was decided for economic reasons that it was necessary to connect Uganda, "the pearl of Africa," to the coast of the continent via a railway. 30 The resultant Mombasa-Kisumu railway fostered the growth of important centres at key points along the route, including at Nairobi. 31 In 1896, Nairobi's first permanent buildings were erected, and Sergeant George Ellis built a transport depot, with stores and stables for oxen and mules, and became the first European to live in Nairobi. 32 By 1899, the railway had reached Nairobi and a station, workshop, and yards were constructed. 33 As with other early colonial towns that were dominated by political administration and economic functions, the building of the railway and the development of Nairobi also provided opportunities for employment and trade for the indigenous population. 34 In 1898, groups like the Isaq and Herti Somali that played important roles as clerks, interpreters, and soldiers were given permission to construct a number of buildings by the highest serving representative of the Imperial British East Africa Company at Nairobi, Sub-Commissioner John Ainsworth. 35 In 1902, they began paying a rent of two rupees per house per month to the Land Office, before becoming liable for the hut and poll tax in 1907. 36 As the most senior European official in Nairobi, Ainsworth was technically responsible for the growth of what was a small frontier town. However, the initial development of Nairobi was largely unplanned and uncontrolled, especially after 1904, when European settlement increased rapidly. Between 1901 and 1912, the population of Nairobi increased from 8,000 to 20,000. 37 Nonetheless, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century the city could be divided into seven distinct areas: the railway centre, the Indian bazaar, the European business and administrative centre, the railway quarters, the Dhobi quarter, the European residential suburb (Parklands), and the military barracks outside of the town. 38 Most of the non-European population lived either in the Indian bazaar, or in various African "villages." 39 These included the unplanned African estates of Kileleshwa, Mji wa Mombasa, Masikini, and Pangani, as well as the four Somali villages, which were all located in heart of the European business and administrative centre, bounded by Fort Hall Road (now Murang'a Road) to the north and Ngara Road to the west. 40 In 1913, the residents of the villages paid 355 rupees to have water installed, and by 1916, when the government of the protectorate communicated its desire to relocate the villages to M'bagathi, there were also 20 electric lights spread across them, eight in a mosque, and one in a school, with the rest installed in private dwellings. 41 In the two larger villages, which were known by the names of their two headmen, Hussein Ali and Hassan Hersi (both Isaq Somali), there were 64 houses (owned by 57 individuals) and 44 houses respectively. 42 Most of the buildings were made of corrugated iron supported with timber, and had ceilings and walls made of matchboarding, though there were also four stone houses. Both the mosque and school were made of iron, and according to the Commissioner of the EAP, Henry Belfield, the furniture, clothes, and general standard of buildings within the Somali villages, suggested great prosperity. 43 However, the authorities also regarded the Somali and their villages as surplus to the needs of the town and its economy, as well as a menace to health, law, and order. 44 This was a reflection of the fact that urban policy in Africa aimed to entrench the urban privileges of the European population, which meant restricting permanent African residence as much as possible. 45 For example, the use of the term "village" to describe African estates was deliberately intended to evoke a sense of rural Africa and therefore exclude them from really being part of the city. 46 In the case of Nairobi, European speculators had acquired plots in the early years of the settlement of the city, and they did not want to see their investments hampered by letting Africans build houses. 47 This was combined with the fact that Africans came to be associated with disease, even though colonial rule was supposed to bring qualitative improvements in the conditions of life experienced by the native population. 48 The existence of the four Somali villages, and other African estates located in Nairobi, therefore conflicted with a combination of European commercial interests and new developments in tropical medicine. As such, and as with elsewhere in Africa at the time, the combination of economic policy and sanitary science was used as a motivation and justification to expel Africans from European towns, and for the development of segregationist policies. 49 
The Move to M'bagathi and the New Model Village
The first attempt to regulate African settlement in Nairobi and replace the informal estates that had grown up there with a publicly funded housing project was in 1911. 50 By this time, the relative scarcity of African housing was thought to be adversely affecting the supply of labor to the town. 51 It was certainly the case that protectorate officials had to balance the desire to resist African housing with the need to maintain labour supply. 52 Five years earlier, a report into the sanitation of Nairobi and the townships of Naivasha, Nakuru, and Kisumu by George Bransby-Williams had also recommended the building of a new Indian bazaar and a new native location, so that by 1910, colonial officials recognised the need to replace and supplement African village settlements that were "in a shocking insanitary condition." 53 There were outbreaks of the plague in 1901-2 and 1904, and then again in 1911, 1912, and 1913. 54 The initial plan for a housing project was nonetheless postponed for financial reasons. However, an outbreak of the plague in 1913, which coincided with an inoculation campaign in the protectorate's labor camps, resulted in Professor J. Simpson being commissioned to enquire into the state of health and sickness in the country, as well as to examine sanitary conditions. 55 Philip Curtin describes Simpson's report as the most elaborate proposal to combine racist and sanitary objectives in Africa between 1914 and 1919. 56 As well as dealing with the EAP, the report also dealt with sanitary matters in Uganda and Zanzibar, and concluded that the commercial area of Nairobi was "was one of the most insanitary I have seen." 57 Simpson recommended the establishment of an African Location, as well as the separation of racial groups for both commercial and residential purposes. 58 This included the demolition of the Indian bazaar and the removal of the four Somali villages, which were in an area that Simpson set aside for Europeans, or "better class" (i.e., wealthy) Asiatics. 59 Commercial interests also underlay Simpson's recommendations. Between 1908 and 1914, land values in the protectorate increased 4,000 percent, and Simpson was explicit in stating that the land that was to be expropriated as part of the plan was among the most valuable in Nairobi. 60 Public health arguments may have provided the evidence for demolition and eviction, but economic policy was also a clear motivation. 61 This corresponds to a trend noted in medical history whereby colonial officials used their power over medical knowledge to construct epidemics for other purposes, and Luise White argues that there is evidence to suggest that the Medical Officer of Health falsified plague records in 1917 in order to find a reason to relocate the Somalis. 62 The implementation of Simpson's plan was also delayed, this time by the outbreak of the First World War. However, the report created what White describes as a "new gospel" for the municipal officials, and on 26 August 1916, all Somali headmen living in Nairobi were informed of the government's decision to relocate them to M'bagathi. 63 The decision was taken following the expansion of Swamp Road in January 1915, which cut through Hassan Hersi's village, in order to create a thoroughfare between the European residential area of Parklands and the centre of Nairobi. During the extension work, the medical authorities discovered nearly twenty cases of Smallpox in the village, and the Europeans living nearby, as well as those that were to be regular users of the new road, submitted a request for the removal of the Somali. The governor of the EAP was "entirely in sympathy with their desire," and reported that the "proximity of these Somali cannot at any time be anything other than objectionable," as well as constituting an "actual source of danger." 64 The reasons behind the decision to pursue the eviction of the Nairobi Somali are twofold. First was the desire to limit and control the Somali livestock trade, which was thought to transgress British quarantine regulations, and therefore undermine concurrent attempts to control animal disease. 65 A second reason was a broader concern with "detribalized" Africans by the middle of the decade. As well as the Isaq and Herti in central Nairobi, the protectorate authorities were also attempting to come to terms with the 1911 settlement of Sudanese ex-soldiers at Kibera. Like the Nairobi Somali, the Sudanese living in Kibera had played important roles in the KAR during the first establishment of the protectorate, but became a problem when they retired or became too sick for work, especially as they settled on land that was increasing in value. 66 In the months before the notice of relocation was issued to the Somali, Ainsworth, who was now a provincial commissioner in Nyanza, commented that "detribalized" askaris would degenerate into a class of "professional beggars and hangers on." 67 The response of the Somali to the notification of their relocation was to call a meeting on the N'gara Plains on 15, 16 and 17 September 1916. Five men, Hussein Ali, Hassan Hersi, Abu Bakar Sugale, Hassan Yusuf, and Aden Jama, were chosen to represent about 300 village residents, and they employed the solicitors, Shapely and Schwartz to draft their complaints, and to present them to both the protectorate authorities and the British government. They also employed the architects Tate, Smith, and Henderson to construct plans for an alternative new model village. 68 This was not the first time that the Nairobi Somali had sought counsel against a decision made by the authorities. When Bransby-Williams first suggested the construction of a new native location in 1907, a number of Somalis already living in Nairobi threatened to take legal action against the government if they were to be moved from the land that they occupied. 69 Correspondence between Shapely and Schwartz, the governor of EAP, and the secretary of state for the colonies details the reasons put forward by the Somali for rejecting the M'bagathi move. First, the Somali families emphasized the longevity of their residence in Nairobi, having lived on their existing sites for 17 years. They pointed to the fact that they had paid their taxes, and paid for both water and electricity in the villages, as well as for the construction of both a mosque and a school. In addition, it was pointed out that the Somali inhabitants of the villages had worked for the government and military as askaris and interpreters, and that it would be impossible for them to carry out their business in Nairobi, if they were living in M'bagathi. 70 In particular, those involved in the livestock trade argued that they needed to be in Nairobi to keep up to date with the price of sheep and goats, while others wanted to be in regular contact with the British firms that arranged safaris. 71 It is therefore important to note that the Nairobi Somali were not completely against relocation. It is certainly the case that when Swamp Road was extended in 1915, Hassan Hersi understood that his village would have to be moved, but only on the understanding that this would happen when all the other African villages in Nairobi were relocated, as per Simpson's recommendation for the creation of a native location, and if they were relocated to a site nearer the city centre than M'bagathi. 72 Shapely and Schwartz therefore suggested that the location of a new Somali village should be adjacent to the new native location proposed by Simpson, though they argued that there would have to be a clear division between the native location and the Somali village, marked by a road or boundary. 73 This corresponds to the anomalous status occupied by the Somali in the EAP, whereby they were often regarded as "not quite" African. 74 Shapely and Schwartz also requested the government pay the Nairobi Somali compensation for the cost of moving, as well as for the value of their existing structures. 75 In agreeing in principle to the relocation of the Somali villages, even if not to M'bagathi, the Nairobi Somali sought security of tenure. They requested Shapely and Schwartz to recommend the construction of houses made of stone or cement, with ceilings ten feet high, bathrooms with drainage, and crucially, a 99-year lease. 76 The architectural plans for the model village produced by Tate, Smith, and Henderson provide an illustration of how the Somali envisaged model village could be realized. The plan shows a central 100-foot wide boulevard lined with eucalyptus trees for keeping away mosquitoes. Secondary streets with plots for housing run parallel to the main boulevard and are 60 feet wide, and 20-foot wide back streets for drainage run between each two rows of houses. The secondary streets are divided into individual plots of either 3,000 square feet (60 by 50 feet), or 2,000 square feet (50 feet by 50 feet). This gave enough room for the construction of a two roomed house with a verandah and bathroom, and separate toilet and kitchen on each plot. It was estimated that the cost of each house would be 2,400 rupees, and each would also have to be rat proof, as far as possible, and connected to water. The proposed village plan also depicts a main square to the north of the main boulevard, containing a central mosque, school, and hotel. 77 As leverage for the Somali proposed village, though not on the instruction of the Somali, Shapely and Schwartz also made clear to both the colonial authorities and the British government that the scheme had the advantage of settling the Nairobi Somali in a way that gave the government easy administration over them, as well as giving the Somali a permanent stake in the country. This, they pointed out, was in contrast to the government projected nomadic camp at M'bagathi, which would simply "confirm the nomadic mode of existence of the Somali." 78 The tension between the government's proposals for what Shapely and Schwartz call a "nomadic camp" at M'bagathi, and the Somali's own vision of a permanent settled village also reveals one of the contradictions of colonial rule. 79 When Belfield articulated his objection to the proposed model village, he made clear why he preferred relocation to M'bagathi. 80 He argued that as the Nairobi Somali were primarily employed as gun-bearers or livestock traders, M'bagathi was a better location than the Nairobi River, because there was ample grazing. In addition, he pointed to the 1903 East Africa Township Ordinance, which restricted certain classes of animals from Nairobi, and to the fact that many Somali therefore already kept their livestock on the commonage, close to the proposed site at M'bagathi. 81 In making these claims Belfield deliberately evoked what has become an enduring but ultimately one-sided image of the Somali as pastoralists and nomads for his own purposes. 82 However, as Shapely and Schwartz commented, the government's plan to remove the Somali from the city centre and keep them confined to rural areas would be a "set back to the more settled existence that has been a feature of the Somali villages at Nairobi for a very long time." 83 Belfield also rejected any plans for compensating the Somali for either the cost of moving or their previous properties. Nor was he prepared to pay for the construction of any new Somali village. He argued that the "Somali do not play a part in the life of the town to justify it," and added that the Nairobi Somali were well aware of their insecurity of tenure at their existing sites. 84 To support his claim, he pointed to an agreement made between Ainsworth and the Somali in November 1906, which made clear that their occupancy of Nairobi Township was looked upon as a matter subject to the will of the administration, and that they had no claim of any description to the land that they occupied (a similar argument was also made during an attempt to relocate the Sudanese from Kibera during the 1930s). 85 The fact that the Somali had still gone ahead with the construction of the four Somali villages was, according to Belfield, simply proof of their prosperity and ability to meet the costs of their relocation. 86 The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Bonar Law, was more sympathetic to the Somali cause, and the case of the new model village reveals an early rift between the British government in London and the administration in Nairobi. In a note on a letter from Belfield dated 13 November 1916, Law was defiant that the government of the EAP should pay compensation to the Somali as an "act of grace." 87 Not only was Law an advocate of a more vigorous colonial development policy, but there was also the issue of the history of Somali service to the Crown. 88 Belfield responded by urging "most strongly" that the Somali not be paid compensation. He pointed to the costs of doing so, which he estimated could reach 2,000 pounds, and argued that rather than being viewed as an act of grace, paying the Somali compensation would look like a "surrender" by the government, setting a difficult precedent for future removal cases. 89 Although Law accepted that compensation may embarrass the administration when "removing other squatters," he nonetheless insisted on payments being made to the families of those Somalis that were away on duty in the military, or serving as interpreters in the NFD at the time of the move. 90 Belfield was ultimately spared the need to act on the issue of compensation by the on-going events of the First World War, and the plan for the new model village feel into abeyance. The question of the creation of a native location nonetheless resurfaced in 1919, when the new Nairobi Town Council considered plans for the layout of an area where Africans could live decently. 91 Pumwani estate was established in 1921, and the African estates of Mombasa and Masikini were relocated there, as were the four Somali villages. 92 Pumwani, Eastleigh, and the Nairobi Somali
As with earlier attempts to relocate African housing in Nairobi, there was initial reluctance among those required to move to Pumwani (in part because residents had to construct their own houses). 93 However, by 1931 the population had reached 7,173, three thousand more than was originally conceived. 94 In 1938, the village of Pangani was also demolished and moved to Pumwani, so that by 1939, there were well over 8,000 people residing there. 95 Overcrowding was a problem, and what was meant to be a planned African housing estate soon evolved into the kind of uncontrolled settlement that colonial officials were still trying to avoid. 96 Indeed, during the 1940s, Pumwani was regarded by the authorities as a cautionary example of what would occur if semi-permanent buildings were allowed to be built on the periphery of Nairobi, where a growing number of informal African estates were also developing. 97 As with the earlier African locations within the city, these estates were under no proper control, and in addition to houses for workers commuting into Nairobi, coffee stalls, lodging houses, and houses of "ill-fame" were established. 98 The fate of Somali semi-permanent dwellings in Pumwani was therefore revisited at the end of the Second World War. A memorandum on demolition was written in 1946, though it was not implemented, and the estate continued to expand towards the neighbouring estate of Eastleigh. 99 Like Pumwani, Eastleigh was also established in 1921, as a place where Indians could settle when the Indian bazaar was closed. 100 However, according to Godwin Murunga, the poor infrastructure at Eastleigh deterred many wealthier Indians from settling there, and a number of Isaq Somalis also bought a share of over 3,000 plots. 101 Isaq connections to kinsmen in other urban centres in Kenya, as well as to other Somali clans and Muslim pastoralists living in the north of the country, meant that many other Somalis also visited and settled. 102 By the 1930s and 1940s, Eastleigh was the biggest settlement of Somalis in Nairobi. 103 The urban Somali population living in Nairobi therefore became more diverse and dynamic over the course of the colonial period. Networks of trade and kinship drew in Somalis from across the colony, and Somali settlements spread out from the original four Somali villages, to Pumwani and then to Eastleigh. However, this should not obscure an underlying continuity and genealogy of residence that can be traced back to the first settlement of the town. For example, in 1958, the Nairobi city council served demolition orders on 22 houses and two mosques in the first, second, and third Eastleigh sections, which were considered by the authorities to be a public health "problem." 104 Although the dwellings had stone foundations, they were finished with wooden frames and corrugated iron roofs, and the owners were warned that unless the houses were rebuilt in stone, the demolition notices would take effect on 31 March 1959. As with the proposed move to M'bagathi, those affected were quick to mobilize against the order, and they solicited representation for their cause from the United Somali Association, a Nairobi based Somali political association. 105 During the course of a meeting between United Somali Association representatives and the minister for public housing, the United Somali Association spokesman made clear that those living within the condemned houses had 99-year leases to their plots, which they had been in possession of since 1910, when the sale of the land was first made to their fathers. 106 Like their fathers 40 years earlier, those affected by the demolition orders also used it as an opportunity to make demands on the state. During the United Somali Association's negotiations with the council over the demolition, it was pointed out that while the owners of the property were in a position to renovate the existing properties, they were unable to rebuild in stone without financial assistance. Their inability to pay was laid firmly in the hands of the colonial authorities, who were accused of ruining their livelihoods as dealers in livestock, first by the city council's regulation restricting the keeping of livestock at Eastleigh after 1945, and second by the Kenya Meat Commission's policy of buying livestock in the reserves. 107 The city council responded to the petition by the United Somali Association by asking the central housing board for a loan of ten thousand pounds to finance loans to the Somali for the purpose of rebuilding their houses. This was a scheme that was already running elsewhere within Kenya, whereby Africans could apply for a loan of up to 80 percent of the cost of redevelopment, up to 1,200 pounds. 108 In Nakuru, for example, the central housing board had already advanced the Nakuru municipal council a loan so that tenant-purchase houses of "good quality" could replace "a virtual slum quarter of Somali" housing. The Board advanced nine tenths of the cost, and the tenant-purchaser found one tenth. 109 For the scheme in Nairobi, the director of social services and housing proposed that the new houses consist of four rooms plus toilet, shower, bath, and kitchen, but when the United Somali Association responded to the offer, they asked for larger loans for larger houses of two or three thousand pounds, as the potential new owners wanted to become landlords. 110 In the end, only a couple of loans were taken up by the Nairobi Somali to rebuild their houses, but Eastleigh has, nonetheless, continued to be an important Somali neighborhood in Nairobi, which now hosts one of the largest Somali communities outside of Somalia (though some non-Somali also live in the neighborhood). 111 This community combines Kenyan Somalis, Somali refugees from Ethiopia, and Somali refugees from Somalia, many of whom went there following the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. 112 There is no doubt that these recent waves of migration have transformed what were primarily Somali residential areas. Eastleigh is now an important regional hub for a booming trust based trade network that operates across East Africa and into Asia and the Middle East, and in the space of a few square kilometres, there are over forty shopping malls, thousands of shops, and tens of thousands of shopkeepers, market stall owners, and hawkers. 113 As such, public and governmental attention has been skewed towards the presence of the large number of refugees that now reside in Eastleigh, and questions are currently being asked of the right of Somali people to live outside of the large Somali refugee camps at Dadaab and Kakuma. What is more, since the rise of Al-Shabaab, a population that was already stereotyped as refugees and illegal immigrants is now also associated with terrorism and insecurity. 114 This is despite the fact that there is a long history of Somali urban residence in Nairobi, and the fact that Kenyan citizens of Somali origin have asserted their right to a place in the city since the very first establishment of the British EAP. 115 
Conclusions
In 1972, E. R. Turton wrote that the Isaq Somali cannot "be regarded as an urban Somali diaspora." 116 As the acting governor observed in 1916, they took no part in the industrial life of the city, and were primarily stock traders who spent considerable time away from town centres. 117 To the contrary, this article has shown that the political agitation of the Nairobi Somali over the issue of the M'bagathi relocation, and their imaginary for the creation of a new model village did have a specifically urban character, and moreover was a situational strategy aimed at making claims on the state. If colonial capitals were intended to be projections of European power, urban development also created space for the articulation of African demands and aspirations. Andrew Hake described Nairobi as a self-help city, and this can be seen as much through the establishment and development of the original four Somali villages, as through the campaign for a new model village, and most recently through the continued assertion of Somali rights to live and work in the city, despite governmental attempts to exclude them, alongside negative stereotyping as intruders and conduits for terrorism.
NOTES
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